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 ANGELS OF MERCY? 
THE LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT BY 
NURSES IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
 In circumstances where life sustaining treatment appears merely to be drawing out 
the inevitable, English law
1
 does not allow the life of a patient to be actively brought 
to an end. However, death by omission is allowable in these circumstances and it is 
usual practice for agreement to be sought between the healthcare team and a patient or 
their immediate family to withdraw aggressive life sustaining measures such as 
mechanical ventilation or vasoactive drugs
2
. It is highly unusual for withdrawal to 
take place without the agreement of all these parties, and it is often possible to time 
withdrawal so relatives and religious representatives can be near. In practice 
withdrawal is as simple as removing an endotracheal tube and turning off an infusion 
pump and this can be performed by any member of the healthcare team, be it a 
consultant, a junior doctor, or a nurse. The choice may be dictated by family wishes, 
the skill levels of staff or how busy the intensive care unit (ICU) is. The identity of 
this professional is not free of implications, yet where it is a nurse these implications 
have thus far not been explored. It is on the legal and professional implications of 
nurses undertaking the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment that this paper is 
focused. I shall hereafter refer to this act as withdrawal of treatment and, where it is 
undertaken by a nurse, nurse actioned withdrawal of treatment. 
 Due to the highly emotive nature of withdrawal of treatment there are multiple 
pitfalls that may make staff performing these duties vulnerable to complaints and 
perhaps legal action. Family members may not fully accept the inevitability of the 
death of a loved one and change their minds at key stages of the process. After 
withdrawal, the dying process may last for several days
3
 during which patients may 
experience symptoms that distress witnessing family members, such as agonal 
                                                 
1
 While Scottish and Northern Irish law is largely similar in this area, in preparing this paper I 
have not examined the possibility of separate approaches in other countries in the United Kingdom.    
2
 Although there is arguably a positive component to such activities (i.e. D Price, ‘Assisted 
Suicide and Refusing Medical Treatment: Linguistics, Morals and Legal Contortions’ (1996) 4  
Med.L.Rev. 3, 270-299), these are classed as omissions by the law. For a full discussion of the act / 
omission distinction see: G Williams, ‘Acts and Omissions,’ in Intention and Causation in Medical 
Non-Killing (2007), 55-88. 
3
 M. Chiswick,  ‘Parents and end of life decisions in neonatal practice’, (2001) Archives of 
Disease in Childhood Fetal and Neonatal Edition 85  F1-F3 
breathing, a reflexive gasping. Further complaints may arise from members of the 
healthcare team who disagree with the clinical path taken.
4
 Depending on the nature 
and forum of a complaint, nurses may find themselves defending their activities 
against civil action or criminal prosecution, and, because of differences in 
professional and legal standards, whatever the outcome of such an action, they would 
also face the scrutiny of the nursing regulator, the Nursing and Midwifery council 
(NMC), as well as a local disciplinary tribunal. 
 While the Mental Capacity Act 2005 explicitly considers withdrawal of treatment in 
section 4 (5), this consideration is not comprehensive. It is within common law that 
we find doctors named as the professionals with a special dispensation to legally bring 
about death. In Bland
5
 Lord Goff suggests: 
 
I also agree that the doctor's conduct is to be differentiated from that of, for 
example, an interloper who maliciously switches off a life support machine 
because, although the interloper may perform exactly the same act as the doctor 
who discontinues life support, his doing so constitutes interference with the life-
prolonging treatment then being administered by the doctor. 
6
 
 
 While doctors have several defences under common law to the charge of murder
7
 and 
allegations of malpractice, this paper discusses the criminal, civil and professional 
defensibility of nurses undertaking this role. In the absence of a specific body of law 
related to nurse actioned withdrawal I shall discuss the probable legal and 
professional responses by considering parallel cases. Examining some of the 
circumstances in which doctors are allowed undertake activities that result in a death,
8
 
I argue that the unique dispensation by which doctors are legally permitted to perform 
these tasks rests largely on their identity as doctors rather than any distinctive feature 
of their activities themselves, which in the case of withdrawal have been classed as 
                                                 
4
 I think particularly of the complaint brought against the paediatrician Leonard Arthur, and 
described at length in: MJ Gunn, JC Smith, ‘Arthur’s case and the right to life of a Down’s syndrome 
child’ Crim.L.R. (1985) 705-715. 
5
 Op. Cit., n. 5 
6
 Ibid., at 866. 
7
 J Herring, ‘Dying and Death,’ in Medical Law and Ethics (2006) 405-491. 
8
 I acknowledge this wording is controversial, but use it descriptively, in order to clearly 
contrast the legality of such activities when undertaken by doctors with the illegality of their being 
undertaken by others, as the status of nurses can begin to be clarified by their identity in this instance. I 
do not use it lightly or wish to imply the type of value judgement that conventional formulations such 
as ‘withdrawal’ have been constructed to avoid. Similar caveats apply to my discussion of termination 
of pregnancy. 
manslaughter or assisted suicide in similar cases involving members of the public.
9
 
This uniqueness of doctors in the eyes of the law means that, while it is tempting to 
think of medical law for nurses as indistinct from that for doctors, in reality it follows 
the quite separate principles of vicarious liability. While these principles may 
nevertheless avoid classing nurses (and presumably others acting in a similar 
capacity) as Lord Goff's “interlopers”,10 it depends not, like medicine, on a judicial 
recognition of the difficult realities inherent in healthcare provision, but instead upon 
a judicial view that nurses are instruments of doctors with scant capacity for 
independent activity. While nurses may thus have practical exemption from the legal 
consequences of their actions so long as they were acting on the orders of a doctor, 
this judicial position puts them at odds with their professional responsibilities, which 
envisage nurses as independent professionals who are to be held liable for their own 
actions. This fracture between judicial and professional expectation creates the 
possibility of nurses being legally exonerated but professionally censured – a 
possibility made all the more immediate by the multiple, sometimes conflicting, 
layers of regulatory and managerial expectations of the scope of nursing practice 
which can produce strict judgements against individual practitioners. The privations 
of dismissal or deregistration are not slight, and a harmonisation of judicial and 
regulatory views is urgently needed to remove such jeopardy from nurses carrying out 
ethically and professionally legitimate duties. 
 
I. MEDICAL TERMINATION OF LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT  
 
 It is tempting to interpret medical law for nurses as indistinct from that which 
governs doctors; indeed some writers appear to do just that.
11
 As the law permits 
doctors to undertake activities that result in a death in distinct situations, such a 
hypothesis would imagine similar legal protections belonged to nurses. Yet I suggest 
such a hypothesis is incorrect, as nurses are governed by quite distinct legal 
                                                 
9
 Note however that identity as a doctor alone is not a defence in itself: R. v Cox [1992] 
(unreported) concerned a doctor who was convicted of attempted murder after hastening a patient’s 
death, is a good example. In that case, features that would have allowed Dr Cox to use the doctrine of 
double effect as a defence were missing, resulting in his conviction– although he was treated  leniently. 
Given the degree to which the facts of the case transgress the Director of Public Prosecution’s 2010 
guidance on prosecuting assisted suicide, it is likely his treatment would be less lenient today. (See 
Crown Prosecution Service ‘DPP publishes assisted suicide policy’  (2010) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/109_10/> accessed 5 September 2011). 
10
 Op. Cit., n. 5 at 866. 
11
 N Fletcher and J Holt, ‘Nursing the dying,’ in Ethics, Law and Nursing (1995) 201-222. 
mechanisms, and the nuance of these creates a quite different set of problems for the 
profession. Because of the potential for confusing the law for doctors with the law for 
nurses, it is necessary to start the discussion by clarifying the way the law protects 
doctors. Through this discussion I wish to underline a central issue: in these distinct 
situations where doctors undertake activities that result in a death, the law 
distinguishes doctors from other actors, a distinction Lord Goff employs in Bland 
with the terms ‘doctors’ and ‘interlopers’.12 This distinction means that members of 
the public risk severe penalties for undertaking activities that, if performed by a 
doctor, would be viewed as appropriate medicine. As nurses are patently neither 
ordinary members of the public nor doctors, and are not clearly recognised in either 
the statutory or case law that concerns withdrawal of treatment, this raises the 
question of what legal mechanism, if any, exists to allow nurses to carry out acts that 
would risk such penalties. 
 One answer to this is that the mechanisms by which the law refrains from 
criminalising these activities are circumspect, and that judges try hard to mould the 
law so that properly conducted medicine is not criminalised.
13
 Yet, although medical 
case law can be circumspect,
14
 its rulings are dominated by the central position of 
doctors to them to such an extent that they cannot comfortably be said to include 
nurses, or other arguably legitimate persons, in their remit. Instead, I shall argue later, 
the only way we can infer permission for similar actions by nurses is to rely on a lack 
of judicial appreciation for nurses as separate and distinct actors, an attitude that 
creates tensions with nurses’ professional responsibilities under their code of practice. 
 
Protecting medicine 
 
 How does the law protect doctors? Although there are a number of examples it is 
only necessary to consider two particular instances: Termination of pregnancy, and 
withdrawal of life sustaining treatment in incompetent persons.
15
 In each of these 
                                                 
12
 Op. cit., n. 5 at 866. 
13
 T James, ‘The Appeal to Law to Provide Public Answers to Bioethical Questions: It All 
Depends What Sort of Answers You Want’ (2008) Health Care Analysis 16, 65-76. 
14
 M Brazier and C Bridge, ‘Coercion or Caring: Analysing Adolescent Autonomy’ (1996) Legal 
Studies  16, 84-109. 
15
 The law also allows three other circumstances where death ensues that shall not be examined 
here. These are withdrawal of treatment following the competent request of the patient as in Ms. B v 
An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429, (Fam); unintended killing as a by-product of the 
administration of painkillers (the doctrine of double effect) and, in Re: A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: 
Medical Treatment) (No.1)[2001] Fam. 147, the killing of one conjoined twin to save the life of 
another. Discussion of these is unnecessary for my argument. 
cases the law distinguishes medical acts from their criminal corollaries, even where 
the act is similar or the same. Because it is the most explicit, it is to the terms of the 
Abortion Act 1967 I will turn to first. 
 The Abortion Act offers a defence to medical practitioners who would otherwise fall 
foul of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861 or the Infant Life Preservation Act 
1929. Although it is not important to detail its exact mechanisms here, it is worthy of 
some interest because the explicit statutory defence it provides is given only to 
doctors, despite the fact many others are involved in a termination of pregnancy. The 
nuances of this caveat were discussed at length in RCN v DHSS
16
 and the conclusion 
of the court is that the Act envisaged a team effort – on what legal basis such a 'team 
effort' rested shall be returned to later. For now it is worth considering if such a notion 
suggests a conflation of the roles of a nurse and a doctor in medical law, or if instead 
nurses’ roles are governed by some other principle, as my suggestion is that the law 
governing each role is distinct. As the practice of much hospital medicine is also a 
‘team effort’ the implications of such a conclusion are far reaching. 
 Unlike termination of pregnancy, withdrawal of life sustaining treatment is not 
protected by statute.
17
 Therefore, because of its circumstantial similarities, a defence 
against murder is needed to demonstrate that, although the death that takes place in 
withdrawal is foreseen, the doctor neither causes the death, nor intends that the death 
takes place,
18
 the components of a successful murder conviction.
19
 Even before the 
watershed of Bland
20
, where precedents were established governing withdrawal, 
academics had proposed the mechanisms by which withdrawal could legally take 
place
21
. The first element of murder, causation, could be evaded by classifying 
withdrawal of treatment as an omission rather than a positive act; in other words it is 
the underlying health condition that positively causes death. Yet classifying 
withdrawal as an omission carries with it a further potential liability. Duty of Care, 
which, under the ordinary principles of the law of negligence, conceivably imposes on 
doctors a compulsion to act positively to save life. While the existence of such a duty 
brings with it the risk of civil liability arising from withdrawal of treatment, it also has 
                                                 
16
 Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] 1 All ER 545 
17
 Although it is referred to by the Mental Capacity Act s.4(5), the Act contains minimal 
guidance for practice. 
18
 This is not strictly true of cases involving persistant vegetative state inasmuch as they do 
appear to accept there is an intention to end life. This distinction is acknowledged at the end of this 
section. 
19
 Op. cit., n. 7 
20
 Op. cit., n. 5 
21
 R Huxtable, ‘Beyond Bland - hedging bets on the value of life?’ in Euthanasia, ethics and the 
law: from conflict to compromise (2007), 115-140. 
implications of criminality, as failing to follow that duty would be negligent, and the 
resulting death would lead in all likelihood to a prosecution for gross negligence 
manslaughter. However these unwelcome outcomes might be ameliorated if, instead 
of simply acting to save life, this duty was to act in the best interests of the patient. In 
this case it could be concluded that a patient's best interests might sometimes be 
served by a doctor's inaction. In the case of the competent patient such interests could 
be determined by the patient's wishes, in the case of an incompetent patient, by 
reference to established medical practice, as defined by the Bolam
22
 test. While this 
position clearly unfolds in Bland
23
 there are inconsistencies in its approach: in 
particular the death that results from withdrawal of treatment in Bland
24
 is in some 
senses intended (albeit lawful because it results from an omission). The more 
common position is now most coherently found in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
where section 4 (5) makes it clear that death must only be an unintended side-effect of 
acting in a patient’s best interests. 
 
Doctors and interlopers 
 
 Between the Mental Capacity Act and Bland
25
 we can describe the legal mechanisms 
for withdrawal in detail. But do these mechanisms apply to nurses? The answer to this 
seems at least debatable because Bland
26
, which contains the fleshed out thinking of 
the legal position, appears quite specific about who should be doing the withdrawal, 
inasmuch as Lord Goff’s speech explains the sharp differentiation between 
withdrawal of treatment by a doctor and withdrawal by another.
27
 
Members of the public taking actions that bear all the hallmarks of withdrawal of 
treatment – non-malicious removal of life sustaining equipment in futile medical 
cases – have found themselves subject to legal penalty. Few authors have researched 
the law’s attitude to members of the public involved in quasi-withdrawal, and I am 
indebted to the work of Huxtable
28
 who analyses two of these rare cases: Watts
29
 
concerned the conviction of a mother for the involuntary manslaughter of her 
                                                 
22
 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583 
23
 Op. cit., n. 5 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
bid. 
27
 Ibid. at 866. 
28
 Op. cit., no. 21 
29
 C Barsby, ‘Case Comment - Manslaughter - ingredients of offence where death caused by 
gross negligence’ Crim.L.R. (November 1998) 833. 
daughter, a severely brain damaged 14 month old, for acts analogous to those of a 
withdrawing doctor. The daughter, Abigail, was so brain damaged she was unable to 
breathe without help
30
 and had already been subject to a not for resuscitation 
order.
31,32
 After leaving her bedside for a few minutes, Abigail's mother claimed to 
have returned to find Abigail's tracheostomy tube out of her neck; despite shouting for 
help Abigail died soon afterwards. The crown prosecution service obtained a 
successful conviction on the basis that Abigail's mother had in fact removed the tube 
before leaving the bedside. She was convicted by the jury and given an eighteen 
month suspended jail sentence for Abigail's manslaughter. Although the conviction 
was eventually quashed on appeal, it was due to a legal technicality.  
 In the second case a grandson tried to disconnect life sustaining equipment from his 
grandmother.
33
 Shara Karapetian, described by the judge as “devoted” to his 
grandmother, barricaded himself in the side-room where she was being treated and 
switched off machines, before cutting her intravenous drug line with scissors. Again 
the close resemblance of these actions to those of a withdrawing doctor did not 
prevent a suspended sentence for attempted murder being imposed, the judge 
describing it as a bizarre attempt at mercy killing. 
 In his examination of these cases, Huxtable
34
 suggests that it is neither the interests of 
the patient nor the actions of the withdrawer that allow withdrawal to legally take 
place, but instead the identity of the withdrawer as a doctor. In such a way these 
cases, of the outcome of surreptitious and unilateral action outside the specific plans 
or orders of a doctor, demonstrate precisely what Lord Goff meant by “interference 
with the life-prolonging treatment then being administered by the doctor”.35 Doctors 
represent the properly constituted authority for such decisions, and without their 
authority, withdrawal cannot take place. Yet the authority is not just the fiat of the 
doctor; as the case of Cox
36
 (where a doctor was convicted of attempted murder after 
administering potassium to a patient to hasten their death) demonstrates, identity as a 
doctor is not a defence in itself. A process must be followed, where the doctor must be 
seen to arbitrate best interests with the patient or their proxies, a process that is now 
                                                 
30
 I Burrell, ‘Appeal clears mother of killing disabled baby’ The Independent (London, 19 May 
1998) 
31
 Op. cit., n. 21 
32
 Although we should note she was being treated, and not subject to any planned withdrawal. 
33
 G Finn, ‘Graduate in mercy killing bid freed’ The Independent, (London, 21 August 1999). 
34
 Supra., n. 31 
35
 Op. cit., n. 5 at 866. 
36
 R. v Cox Op. cit., n. 9 
detailed in the Mental Capacity Act.
37
 It is perhaps as part of this process of the 
exercise of properly constituted authority, that we begin to see the place of nurse 
actioned withdrawal begin to emerge. 
 
Are Nurses Lord Goff’s Interlopers? 
 
We now come to the crux of the issue – the question of who should perform the actual 
act of withdrawal of life sustaining treatment. The preceding section shows that 
doctors are central to the decision to withdraw, as the properly constituted authority, 
that the death that follows withdrawal is allowable as the switching off of the life 
support machine by a doctor is classified as an omission rather than an act, and that 
doctors are not compelled to act otherwise because their duty of care is to the patient’s 
interests, rather than to their health. These are unique dispensations that do not apply 
to the interloper, and even if their actions are identical to those of the doctor, the 
interloper will be at a fault that the doctor does not commit. Where does this leave 
nurses? Obviously a nurse who acts surreptitiously and unilaterally will be classed as 
an interloper, and treated as such. But in consideration of a nurse’s role in withdrawal 
of treatment, particularly a nurse, who, without direct medical supervision (although 
with medical and familial agreement) stops pumps, removes wires and switches off 
machines, a question hangs on how we should interpret Lord Goff's words – as his 
interloper is identified as “malicious”, could his “doctor” be any healthcare 
professional acting without malice? Or, instead, are doctors to be differentiated from 
all others, including other health professionals, as Greene MR did in Gold v Essex 
where he commented: “...nurses are taken as the type of skilled person on the hospital 
staff other than medical men”. 38 
                                                 
37
 This need for medical arbitration of best interests is underlined by the process by which those 
competent to judge their own best interests can refuse life sustaining treatment. In this case the 
principle of autonomy takes a central role by dictating that the individual is the one best placed to 
determine their interests. Yet in this central role autonomy contends with the notion capacity, that is, 
whether an individual is competent to make such a determination of their interests for themselves. It is 
in this need for collaboration of mental competence that the doctors professional role in both 
confirming capacity, and in informing the determination of best interests that arises from it, is quite 
unique from members of the public, however closely they know the individual and however allied to 
that individuals interests they may appear. Indeed, where a doctor’s duty of care may allow them to 
omit to act, the duty of a family member may be such that passivity in the face of attempts to end life 
may be viewed as a sort of active assistance and thus potentially open to charges of assisting suicide. 
See Huxtable’s contrast of legal treatment of passive assistance of suicide by doctors and family 
members in
 
R Huxtable, ‘Assisted Suicide in 'the shadowy area of mercy killing'’, in Euthanasia, ethics 
and the law: from conflict to compromise, Op. cit., n. 21, 69-70. 
38
 Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293, at 303. 
 There are several answers to such a question, and that only a test of the law would 
fully resolve them. The multifaceted nature of the answer may lie in the subordinate 
professional nature of nurses, and it is to a more general discussion of nurses in the 
law that I turn in the next section. As we have seen, although not settling the place of 
nurses, it is evident from these that Lord Goff's words were not symbolic: The cases 
considered by Huxtable demonstrate that for parents and relatives, Lord Goff's 
comments adequately express the law. Even a person as seemingly legitimate as a 
close relative or the parent of a child is an interloper where withdrawal of treatment is 
concerned. Yet there is a further case that takes us a little closer to establishing legal 
attitudes to nurse actioned withdrawal. 
 John Lovell, an emphysema patient who had been dependent on a ventilator for eight 
years, began repeatedly disconnecting his ventilation tubing, begging his nurses to be 
allowed to die.
39
 After several days of this behaviour, his consultant instructed a 
senior nurse to turn off his ventilator's disconnection alarm. He was subsequently 
given diamorphine
40
 to make him comfortable and was found dead soon afterwards 
having apparently disconnected his own ventilation tubing once more. The coroner 
had no doubt that this was a case of upholding patient autonomy and mentioned the 
House of Lords Select Committee Report on medical ethics in his verdict, which he 
recorded as death by natural causes. The case was therefore treated as a competent 
withdrawal of treatment, with the senior nurse's actions somewhat analogous to a 
doctor's, and, like a doctor, the nurse avoided the legal pitfalls of her actions. The 
exoneration of these actions by the coroner takes us a step closer to surmising that 
nurse actioned withdrawal of treatment may not result in prosecution; however there 
are caveats to this conclusion: Coroners cases carry no weight of precedent, and the 
silencing of an alarm is conceivably further removed from withdrawal than the 
physical disconnection of a ventilator. Furthermore there is another issue raised by 
this case, although not one unique to its circumstances – that of the ever present 
potential for civil action by a dissatisfied family: Following the coroner's verdict Mr 
Lovell's widow, who, at Mr Lovell's request, had not been consulted about the 
decision and was away from his bedside when he died, expressed dissatisfaction with 
the verdict and registered a formal complaint with the hospital. Although a threatened 
civil action seems not to have materialised from this quarter, it underlines the risks of 
disgruntled family members taking such action: such threats are not infrequently 
                                                 
39
 E Rowe, ‘Fundamental decisions’ (1994) 8 Nursing Standard 27, 21. 
40
 J Cassidy, ‘Nurse defends her role in turning off patient's alarm’ (1994) 90 Nursing Times 12, 
5. 
heard from distraught relatives searching for someone to hold accountable for the 
tragedy they are experiencing. Of course, such risks must not be overplayed as they 
are ever present within healthcare practice, but with unclear legal and professional 
attitudes to the practice of nurse actioned withdrawal, the delicate balance between 
clinical necessity and the everyday risk of litigation is disturbed. The bringing of a 
civil action, even one that fails in the courts, would precipitate an investigation by the 
both the hospital authorities and the nursing regulator where a nurse would need to 
defend their actions according to quite different standards to those that apply in law, 
and censure could have shattering effects on a nurse's career. 
 We have seen that the law governing withdrawal of treatment uses a complex 
formula to protect Doctors from legal repercussions of their actions, and that this 
protection does not extend to members of the public even when they undertake 
analogous acts. The case of John Lovell suggests nurses may somehow be protected 
by the law yet does not explain why such a position is so. In the next section I shall 
look at legal and professional treatments of Nurses and argue that both the law and the 
professional regulator have simplified views of the role of the nurse, suggesting nurse 
actioned withdrawal may have unpredictable results. It seems to be a reasonable 
assumption that, if the nurse had multidisciplinary support, a judge would view their 
case sympathetically, perhaps using their ability to weave a defence in the nurse's 
favour. We should note, however, that in both the Watts
41
 and the Karapetian
42
 cases 
the judge showed considerable sympathy to the defendant, handing down short, non-
custodial sentences in both cases. Judicial sympathy may therefore result in lenient 
treatment rather than exemption. Even in scenarios where a nurse is found neither 
guilty or liable (depending on the type of action) in law, they face the additional 
hurdles of a managerial structure that may not accept (or understand) their role and a 
nursing regulator mandated to protect the public. Depending on the regulator’s 
perceptions of public protection, a nurse may still be subject to harsh penalties for 
their part in the act of withdrawal; this double jeopardy will also be examined more 
closely below. 
 
II. NURSES AS WITHDRAWERS – LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
POSSIBILITIES 
 
                                                 
41
 Op. cit., n. 29 
42
 Op. cit., n. 33 
 In this section I shall examine the legal and professional consequences of nurse 
actioned withdrawal of treatment. As no cases exist it will be necessary to reflect on 
the treatment of nurses in other scenarios, although the virtual invisibility of the 
nursing profession from the law makes the task of deciding legal consequences more 
arduous. I examine the approaches to nursing that exist under the current law and 
suggest that, by viewing nursing duties as an extension of medical acts (or omissions), 
the law gives sufficient leeway for a nurse to escape liability for an act of withdrawal 
that can be demonstrated to be under the control of a doctor. The issue of professional 
liability is somewhat more vexed as professional responsibility extends far beyond the 
court's expectation of nurses merely obeying doctors’ orders and provides scope for 
sharp differences of response between courts and regulators. I argue that a 
harmonisation of judicial and regulatory views would provide a less unpredictable 
working environment for nurses; such developments may ultimately rely on the 
formulation of statute by parliament and such a move is likely to be some time away. 
 In RCN v DHSS
43
 counsels for the DHSS suggests at 816: 
 
If a highly skilled gynaecologist, having cut his hand, watched a highly skilled 
nurse perform an operation, the act would be his act. It does not matter who 
does what so long as the direction and supervision is by the doctor and what is 
done is according to normal recognised medical practice. 
 
 In 1994, Valerie Tomlinson, a theatre sister of 30 years experience was reported by a 
colleague for conducting three parts of an appendectomy while supervised by a 
surgeon with whom she had “a mutual trust and understanding”, Mr Bhatti. Both she 
and the surgeon were suspended but reinstated with a final written warning following 
a disciplinary hearing at the NHS trust.
44,45
 Meanwhile, a hospital sister at a geriatric 
day unit who followed the instructions of her consultant and surreptitiously 
tranquillised an aggressive patient who was refusing compulsory admission to the 
wards for deteriorating mental health was reported by a colleague and suspended from 
duty. At her disciplinary tribunal she was given a final written warning and told she 
had only narrowly escaped dismissal, meanwhile a disciplinary inquiry exonerated the 
consultant of professional misconduct.
46
 
                                                 
43
 Op. Cit., n.16 
44
 G Cooper, ‘Appendix nurse to keep surgery job’ The Independent (London, January 27 1995) 
45
 Anon., ‘British surgeon in appendix row keeps his job’ (1995) 310 British Medical Journal  
6976, 348. 
46
 J Kellett, ‘An Ethical Dilemma: A Nurse is suspended’ (1996) 313 British Medical Journal 
7067, 1249-50. 
 The disciplinary penalties for both nurses were the same, implying that the counsels 
were at fault in their arguments that obeying doctor's orders is a credible defence – yet 
I suggest in the next section that their comment was well founded in case law, an 
assertion reinforced by the judgment the Lords delivered in RCN v DHSS
47
 after 
hearing the counsel's arguments.
48
 Furthermore, in both the cases above it is notable 
that no illegal act was alleged. In the light of this, the legal and regulatory context of 
these cases deserves explanation. In the case of a theatre nurse undertaking an 
operation while supervised by a surgeon, it is unclear precisely what regulation may 
have been transgressed, as the disciplinary proceedings were not a matter of public 
record, but instead took place between Sister Tomlinson and her managers. No law 
prevents any competent individual from undertaking an operation, yet in the words of 
the trust, such actions went “beyond what would normally be expected of a theatre 
nurse”.49 National guidelines were not transgressed,50 and as the patient did not 
complain and Tomlinson practiced the operation competently, no action was taken by 
the nursing regulator.
51
 In the case of disciplinary proceedings for covert 
administration of medication, once again the closed doors nature of the tribunal means 
it is unclear what local protocol was breached. Yet managerial action does not accord 
with the national guidelines available at the time for covert administration of 
medicines,
52,53
 which, while suggesting that covert administration is far from ideal 
practice, accept that in a patient lacking capacity it may be undertaken if it is in their 
best interests. 
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 More than anything else, these cases highlight the vulnerability of nurses to local 
protocols which create a further level of potentially conflicting regulatory demands on 
their practice. The capriciousness of such protocol may be fuelled by the poorly 
defined nature of nursing duties which in practice lack clear demarcation between the 
roles of doctor and nurse in the everyday delivery of healthcare. The divergence 
between legal, managerial and regulatory responses is not trivial. While nurses may 
be spared legal penalties due to the blunt principles of vicarious liability, they may 
find their career impaired, or indeed being debarred from practising it altogether for 
complying with those same principles. Patient care is also likely to suffer if the law 
holds that a nurse has a primary duty to the doctors' instructions rather than the patient 
– and what of the much touted protection for whistle-blowers who expose bad 
practice? As we shall see, the environment created by the conflict between legal and 
professional responsibilities is chaotic indeed. 
 
 
Nurses in the law 
 
 There are few cases where the judiciary specifically addresses the role of nurses, and 
even more rarely does the role of the nurse form the ratio dicidendi. The position of 
nursing as an ancillary profession to medicine means that many judgments simply do 
not address nurses at all, even when they are central to the case at hand.
54
 Chiarella 
suggests this invisibility is partly based on judicial ignorance of the work nurses 
perform, which is characterised as mundane, domestic, and, when not directly 
replacing a medical role, unskilled.
55
  Certainly in the three cases examined, all of 
which concern nurses' liability for their actions, the law advances a view that nurses' 
primary duties are to doctors, rather than patients, a standpoint that is at variance to 
the nursing code of professional practice.
56
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 Although it now carries little authority in the determination of vicarious liability,
57
 
the place of nurses suggested within Farwell LJ’s speech in Hillyer58 seems to begin 
an unbroken line of reasoning most recently aired in RCN v DHSS
59
. Hillyer
60
 was a 
negligence case brought by a patient who, following surgery, had been burned by the 
hot bricks that were routinely used by nurses to warm post-operative patients at that 
time. In that case, the hospital was judged not to have vicarious liability for the 
negligence of the nurses. The appeal court judges disagreed on the reason and 
advanced two views of a nurses' professional standing. Kennedy LJ suggested that, 
within the boundaries of the operating theatre, the nurses were professionals and thus 
were liable for their own actions. Meanwhile, Farwell LJ proposed that they were 
under the control of the surgeon at the time, so the surgeon was vicariously liable for 
their actions. Outside the operating theatre both agreed that the hospital assumed 
vicarious liability as nurses’ roles in that environment were domestic rather than 
professional.  
 The vicarious liability question was settled in Gold v Essex
61
, a negligence case 
brought on behalf of a child who suffered facial burns due to the actions of a 
radiographer, that explicitly overturned Hillyer
62
 when it was held that the hospital's 
vicarious liability extended to any negligent employee. Despite the fact the hearing 
was about a radiographer, the judgment refers almost exclusively to nurses, which 
Greene MR explains is because legally they represent the type of skilled hospital 
employee apart from doctors.
63
 Although delivering a judgment that the hospital was 
vicariously liable for nurses' actions, the judgment also seems to side with the 
principle advanced by Farwell LJ in Hillyer;
64
 both Greene MR and Goddard LJ voice 
similar opinions that a nurse cannot be negligent when carrying out a doctors’ orders: 
 
I should myself have thought that the true ground on which the hospital escapes 
liability for the act of a nurse who, whether in the operating theatre or 
elsewhere, is acting under the instructions of the surgeon or doctor is, not that 
                                                                                                                                            
(2008) <http://www.nmc-uk.org/Nurses-and-midwives/The-code/The-code-in-full/> accessed on 16 
December 2011 
57
 My understanding from its distinguishing in Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343 
(at 361) is that it may still exempt a hospital of vicarious liability for a surgeon whom the patient 
personally selects and employs. 
58
 Hillyer v Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 KB 820, at 826 
59
 Op. cit., n. 16 
60
 Supra,  n. 58 
61
 Op. cit., n. 38 
62
 Supra,  n. 58 
63
 As I commented earlier, this may be evidence of an intent to differentiate by choosing to 
name “doctors” in Lord Goff's speech in Bland. 
64
 Ibid. 
pro hac vice she ceases to be the servant of the hospital, but that she is not 
guilty of negligence if she carries out the orders of the surgeon or doctor, 
however negligent those orders may be. 
65
 
 
 In the light of this statement it is perhaps unsurprising that a generation later in RCN 
v DHSS,
66
 the question of the degree to which nurses’ actions could be called their 
own was again answered with a ruling that suggested nurses’ actions might be those 
of the doctors under whose instruction they worked. The case concerned the extra-
amniotic method of termination of pregnancy, where a catheter is inserted via the 
cervix into the uterus into which an abortifacient infusion is administered, causing the 
miscarriage of the fetus. A Department of Health and Social Security circular advised 
that nurses should be able to connect and administer the abortifacient infusions used 
to terminate the pregnancy, provided a doctor had decided on the treatment and 
inserted the catheter. The Royal College of Nursing contended that this advice was 
not correct in law, as the Abortion Act 1967 states: 
“...a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when 
a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner” ...and therefore 
abortifacient administration by a nurse was in contravention of the law. The Lords 
found in the department's favour by a 3-2 majority, suggesting aspects of the Abortion 
Act implied a team effort, and thus its protection must extend to the team at large, not 
just the Doctor concerned. Lord Diplock suggested this was manifest in the 
requirement for terminations to take place in hospital. Meanwhile both Lords Keith of 
Kinkel and Roskill find their evidence in the wording of the clause in Section 4 
paragraph 1 of the Abortion Act providing a right of conscientious objection to 
participation, which they felt implied a wider process. Again, other comments imply 
that a nurse's actions are not her own, but rather an extension of a doctors’: 
 
I think that the successive steps taken by a nurse in carrying out the extra-
amniotic process are fully protected provided that the entirety of the treatment 
for the termination of the pregnancy and her participation in it is at all times 
under the control of the doctor even though the doctor is not present throughout 
the entirety of the treatment. 
67
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 The law in this area seems to leave the question of nurses' actions to the supervising 
doctor, perhaps even to the extent of mitigating a negligent act that the nurse performs 
on the doctor's behalf. Here we have a solid basis on which to suggest the law would 
defend nurse actioned withdrawal. There is further reason to suspect this when we 
consider that judges (with an eye to public policy) may surmise it is not in the public 
interest to criminalise nurses, and therefore extend the special treatment allowed to 
doctors to nurses actions as well. Yet there are important caveats to this conclusion; 
vicarious liability does not operate in criminal law, and so could not form a specific 
defence against criminal charges, only civil ones. Furthermore, this argument is based 
largely on obiter dicta and therefore does not have binding authority on future cases. 
As I shall argue below, it is not rational to say that nurses have no responsibility to 
patients except through a doctor, indeed, such judicial assumptions apparently 
contradict statutory moves to promote whistle-blowing under the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998, opening these judgments to accusations of irrational law. 
 Even within civil law the defence of vicarious liability is questionable. Past 
tendencies to permit medical practice to operate in a rarefied, self referential 
atmosphere, exemplified by the use of the Bolam
68
 test to justify apparently irrational 
practices have given way to a less deferential approach to medical conduct.
69,70
 
Judgments such as Bolitho
71
 (where the Lords ruled that medical opinion must have a 
logical basis) show an increasing desire among the judiciary to root out irrational 
assumptions that underlie medical law, and nurses would be well advised to arm 
themselves with more justification than the law provides before defending nurse 
actioned withdrawal in a court, and it is to ethical and practical justifications that I 
suggest they turn.
72
 
 
Negligence and complications in end of life care 
 
 Having raised the spectre of Bolitho
73
, I wish to end this section by considering how 
claims of negligence might arise in a terminal care scenario, as it may not be 
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immediately apparent how this might take place given the usual close involvement of 
the family in agreeing withdrawal of treatment (especially from incompetent patients). 
 While agreement is generally sought between relatives and the healthcare team 
before withdrawal, it is possible that withdrawal of treatment might still be subject to 
post hoc accusations of negligence by a family. There are clear circumstances where 
such accusations may occur when ventilatory support is withdrawn: Agonal breathing, 
an apparently distressing, pre-terminal gasping caused by very high levels of carbon 
dioxide in the blood has been noted to last up to 40 minutes in adults,
74
 while in 
infants it can last considerably longer: 31 hours in one study.
75
 Relatives may be 
unprepared for such events and may feel their loved one has been robbed of the 
dignity that withdrawal was intended to preserve, so that while the death itself may be 
agreed upon, the actual management might form the source of considerable 
dissatisfaction to a significant minority (as was the case with 8% of interviewees in 
the study above).
76
 A further complexity is introduced by the differentiation of such 
breathing from dyspnoea, an acute and agonising inability to breathe adequately, that, 
unlike agonal breathing, is associated with conscious suffering in the patient, and is 
treatable (in the context of terminal care) with increased doses of sedation. The 
existence of such a differential diagnosis at least opens the door for queries of 
negligence. Should such claims be advanced against a nurse it is questionable if the 
courts would accept a bald defence of ‘doctors’ orders’ without comment. 
  Such risks also raise pressing questions of a fracture between law and clinical 
practice suggested by legal arguments that the nurse may perform a negligent act at 
the behest of the doctor and escape responsibility. This seems to indicate a limitation 
in the duty of care owed to the patient, creating a fundamental inconsistency with 
nursing's code of professional practice, which declares: “As a professional, you are 
personally accountable for actions and omissions in your practice and must always be 
able to justify your decisions”. 77 
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 In turn this creates potentially disastrous consequences for nurses who, due to formal 
complaints or civil actions, are called on by their registering body to justify their 
actions, scrutiny that will take place regardless of any legal outcome. The inherently 
unpredictable nature of dying, and the highly charged atmosphere of the death of a 
loved one, makes such situations a possibility and one has only to look the 
complications of terminal care to see how such complaints might arise. It is to these 
considerations we shall now turn. 
 
 
A regulator with teeth – The Nursing and Midwifery Council 
 
 Blurred roles and ambiguous distinctions between spheres of practice are a fact of 
nursing life, particularly in areas such as hospital nursing where doctors and nurses 
work closely together. As the law correctly observes, such healthcare is a team 
activity, and a loyalty to that team will often lead a nurse to set aside feelings of 
professional vulnerability if doing so will expedite the process of care and deliver 
perceived benefits to the patient. In so doing they may assume their activities will be 
vouched for by the doctor in charge, and that, provided they acted in good faith, they 
might be shown understanding in giving an account of their actions. There seems 
then, to be a tension between the perception of a nurse as a member of a team (as 
reflected in the law) and the nurse as a responsible individual within the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council’s (NMC) Code of Professional Conduct78 and managerial 
protocols. This emphasis on the individual has been criticised as mistaken given the 
intrinsically communal nature of healthcare work,
79
 yet this personalisation of 
responsibility has to some extent been the result of attempts to bolster the professional 
autonomy of nursing. Chiarella
80
 argues that these may have missed the mark, 
inasmuch as they sought to alter the status of nursing without altering the fundamental 
structures of wider healthcare decision making, and nursing’s subordinate status 
within these. Such analysis is evidence of deeper tensions within nursing as it seeks to 
both incorporate medical responsibilities and distinguish itself from medicine. Yet 
professional regulation of nurses is now tougher than ever, and the tensions between 
the practicalities of teamworking and the idealisation of practitioner autonomy place 
nurses under significant professional risks. 
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 The widespread loss of confidence in the ability of the medical profession to self 
regulate, underpinned by ideological drives to improve standards by increasing the 
power of health consumers, and fuelled by the successive scandals highlighted in the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry
81
 and the Shipman Inquiry
82
 also resulted in dramatic 
changes to the regulation of other health professionals. The Nurses and Midwifery 
Order 2001 convened a new regulator to oversee nursing, the NMC, which differed in 
important respects from the former regulator, the UKCC, with the emphasis shifting 
from professional regulation to public protection. Lay membership of the regulator 
was increased and half of the council are now non-nurses, paragraphs of UKCC 
guidelines reflecting the impact of deregistration upon practitioners were removed and 
there was a reduction in the standards of proof needed to find nurses guilty of 
misconduct from the criminal (beyond reasonable doubt) to the civil (balance of 
probabilities) standard
83
. Finally the Council for Regulation of Healthcare Excellence 
(CHRE) was given the power to refer any 'unduly lenient' ruling by the NMC to the 
High Court
84
. The overall effect was to create a regulator more zealous than ever in 
rooting out nurses whose practice does not meet their standards. 
 Changes to the burden of proof in malpractice cases mean that nurses who escape the 
courts may nevertheless find themselves stripped of a right to practice by their 
regulator. Given the volatile nature of public opinion and the ability of “right to life” 
groups to motivate it, nurses may be called upon to justify their activities in the 
terminal care environment (consider for instance the recent equating of the Mental 
Capacity Act with “backdoor euthanasia”;85,86 consider too the momentous changes to 
the treatment of disabled children after the trial of paediatrician Leonard Arthur in 
1981 and that this trial was instigated by the anti-abortion pressure group Life).
87
 This 
is against a background of regulatory decisions that have often been criticised for 
excessive zeal rather than undue leniency. Only two cases were referred by the CHRE 
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to the High Court in 2008/9 and one of these was later withdrawn
88
. Meanwhile, court 
appeals by nurses against NMC decisions have resulted in criticism of the regulator 
for disproportionately reflecting on past misdemeanours rather than future patient 
safety,
89,90
 undue severity
91
 and lack of due process.
92
 Some judgements seem 
particularly harsh; for instance, Sarkodie-Gyan
93
 concerned a nurse who, having 
recovered from depression was not allowed to return to practice as she could not 
demonstrate that the stresses of work might not induce a relapse. The recent case of 
Margaret Haywood threw the severe nature of NMC discipline into the public 
consciousness.
94
 Haywood, an experienced nurse, tried unsuccessfully to raise 
concerns about patient maltreatment within the ward where she worked. In frustration 
she contacted a television company and secretly filmed this maltreatment, which was 
then broadcast in a television documentary. After a complaint to the NMC from the 
hospital trust where the abuse took place, Haywood was removed from the nursing 
register for breaching patient confidentiality (on the basis that consent for filming had 
been obtained from patients after footage had been scrutinised by the production 
team). There was outcry and her punishment was eventually downgraded after a 
public campaign
95
. Naturally the NMC may defend such decisions as necessarily firm 
on the basis of upholding the trustworthiness of the profession or protecting patient 
safety, yet such sentiments seem significantly at odds with their conduct in this case. 
But would the NMC remove a nurse from the register for following doctor’s orders? 
Cases of deregistration for following doctors’ orders are rare – perhaps because it is 
rarely advanced as a defence given the explicit advice of influential commentators 
such as Dimond.
96
 However, such cases do exist. Rosser
97
 reports a case where a 
senior midwife was held responsible for a stillbirth that resulted from the 
administration of medication to speed up a slow labour. As the medication had 
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recognised risks to the fetus, the midwife followed protocol and summoned the 
registrar when the fetal heartbeat showed signs of distress. When the registrar made 
no instruction to change the management, the midwife continued with the medication  
and the baby was subsequently delivered stillborn. The professional conduct 
committee of the UKCC, ruled that following doctors orders was not a defence as the 
midwife was personally accountable for the care she gave and removed her from the 
register. Of course, such examples do not exactly match the circumstances of nurse 
actioned withdrawal, however, even without such concrete examples, the existence of 
differing legal and professional expectations represents a disquieting paradox for 
practicing nurses, especially given that nurse actioned withdrawal of treatment results 
in the death of a patient and may cause significant distress to the patient's family. 
Whilst it is important to maintain perspective on the risks of deregistration – only 
0.2% of nurses ever have contact with the NMC over fitness to practice issues
98
 and 
many cases of deregistration are for infractions that are clearly unacceptable – the 
lack of clear guidelines from a regulator known for their strict attitudes, whose 
judgement of nursing practice may be coloured by its proportion of lay members, 
suggests nurses may risk their careers by undertaking legitimate activities. Of course, 
the legal system makes it share of mistakes and has shameful and disproportionate 
verdicts in its history, yet as judges are loath to overturn the verdicts of professional 
bodies
99,100
 faulty verdicts are simply referred back to the NMC for reconsideration; 
the lack oversight may create a concerning lack of responsiveness to the very real 
privations deregistration creates.
101
 
  The disjuncture between legal and professional attitudes appears to make the risk of 
professional censure a real possibility for nurses who get caught up in disputes around 
end of life care. The position of nurses is highly nuanced, and both the regulator and 
the judiciary seem to have part, but not all, of the story. Ultimately, the legal position 
is the fallout from the patchwork of judicial manoeuvres to ensure that properly 
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conducted medicine does not fall foul of the law. Meanwhile professional 
expectations come from both nursings’ ambitions for autonomy and a regulatory 
desire to promote patient safety; a critique of the organisation and status of the 
healthcare professions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the case of the 
topic at hand there are several courses of action that would remedy the current 
situation. First and foremost would be a recommendation for the professional code to 
recognise the nature of teamworking within the healthcare environment, and to 
undertake that no disciplinary action should take place against a nurse who carries out 
express instructions that are themselves accordance with the law.
102
 Nurses 
themselves must also construct a body of evidence that both documents and defends 
their practice in terminal care settings, and such evidence used to inform guidelines 
from professional bodies that can act as quasi-law in the event of scrutiny. Ultimately 
there is a wider need for parliament to produce properly considered statute that can 
replace the current patchwork of common law in order to provide coherent guidance 
for both judiciary and practitioners in end of life care settings, and nurses must join 
with other healthcare professionals to press for this and recognition of their own role 
within it. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 In English law, doctors have been granted special dispensation to end life in certain, 
very specific, circumstances. In termination of pregnancy these circumstances are 
detailed in the Abortion Act; similar dispensations exist in the withdrawal of life 
sustaining treatment. Each of these activities has their corollary in criminal or civil 
law. The mechanisms by which these dispensations are achieved are highly subjective 
and, in the case of withdrawal of life sustaining treatment, considerable weight is 
attached to the opinions of the judiciary over what constitutes an act or omission and 
in what circumstances a duty of care may entail withholding rather than providing 
treatment. Whether this judicial subjectivity can be relied on to grant a dispensation to 
nurses similar to that enjoyed by doctors is unlikely. The deliberate way that the 
actions of doctors have been distinguished from those of other interested parties 
means that judicial sympathy cannot be relied upon, particularly as there exists an, 
albeit slim, body of law that considers the activities of non-medical professionals in 
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hospitals. These cases contain competing versions of the status of nurses: Hillyer
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first advances the idea that nurses could be professionals in their own right, yet also 
characterises their activities as under the control of a doctor.  While Gold v Essex
104
 
establishes that vicarious liability rests with the employer, it contains significant 
obiter dicta which seem to indicate their de facto status as instruments of medical will, 
a status eventually confirmed by RCN v DHSS.
105
 
 Nurses’ professional status as clinical subordinates to doctors is a fact; nursing 
careers climb into education and healthcare management, but never into ultimate 
executive power in the clinical workplace. It is from this subordinate status that the 
judicial attitude to nursing may arise, yet the characterisation of nurses as simple tools 
of doctors is not only inaccurate, but clearly at odds with the requirements of nurses’ 
professional registration, which in turn misses the essentially collaborative nature of 
much healthcare work. It may make irrational law to suggest nurses have a primary 
duty to doctors, rather than patients; it certainly suggests a failure to engage with the 
realities of healthcare practice to treat doctors as a breed apart from their colleagues in 
the ancillary professions despite the identical nature of their workplace and client 
group, and the overlap in their professional duties. It is irrational to suggest nurses 
who comply with an order which they know to be negligent may be spared legal 
penalties due to the blunt principles of vicarious liability, and does nothing to bolster 
the position of a nurse, who, knowing the professional risks to nurses who comply 
unquestioningly with doctors’ orders, is caught in the horns of such a dilemma. The 
case of John Lovell
106
 and the significant dissatisfaction experienced by relatives who 
witness protracted complications of a dying loved one
107
  suggests a likelihood that in 
the highly charged environment of end of life care, nurses will at some stage be called 
upon to justify their actions, if not to the courts, then to their professional regulator. I 
hope that such actions would be viewed sympathetically, but fear nurses may have to 
assert robust reasons for their activities to avoid censure. Medical law is seen by some 
as noteworthy for imaginative interpretations of the law by a judiciary seeking to 
protect the good of medicine, interpretations that have sought to divide medical acts 
from non-medical acts despite flagrant similarities. The unusual legal status of nurses’ 
activities in end of life care, as well as other areas, appears to have been an almost 
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accidental creation of such behaviour, and like much of the law at the end of life, the 
ultimate answer to the current predicament is the creation of well reasoned statute. 
Meanwhile nursing leaders have sought to define nurses as autonomous agents with 
scant regard to the actualities of healthcare delivery. These professional and legal half 
truths have built a fragile edifice that creaks uncomfortably under the weight of 
everyday reality. Should the price of these contradictions be an injustice done to the 
legitimate activities of nurses?
 
